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The United States spendsmore on health carethan any other nation.
In 2003, medical spending
made up more than 15 
percent of U.S. GDP, and if
historical trends persist, this
share will climb to more than
one-third of GDP by 2040.
With medical technology
advancing at an ever-increasing
rate, the potential for spending
on procedures not worth their
costs is growing. But there are
few good ideas for reining in medical costs without hurting patients.
One approach, used in Britain for many years, is rationing. This 
brief examines many of the issues involved with rationing health care 
by applying its principles to radiology, using examples from the budget-
limited British health system. There, policymakers and medical providers
routinely grapple with two difficult and value-laden questions: How
much should be spent on the expensive but life saving technology? 
And how much should be spent on very costly research to evaluate 
that investment?
The United States has not had to confront such issues. But as
outlays rise, the need for the government, private insurers or employers
to set health care spending priorities will intensify. It is time for the
United States to begin investing in the knowledge it will need to control
growth of health care spending.
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Markets operate in a simple way to
encourage efficient consumption.
Consumers buy things if they are
worth more than they cost. The key to
efficient market outcomes is that 
prices reflect costs of production. The
market for health care does not 
operate that way. Once health bills
exceed insurance deductibles, patients
pay little or nothing for their care,
however high the cost and however
small the benefit. 
Managed care sought to curtail high-
cost/low-benefit care—that is, to
ration—by various forms of private
regulation. It failed principally because
consumers’ incentives to seek all
beneficial care overwhelmed adminis-
tered limits managers sought to 
impose. Other nations have rationed
health care for years by setting health
care budgets or regulated fees, effec-
tively controlling the numbers of
hospitals or the amount of medical
equipment, or other devices. None
spends nearly as much as the United
States does, and many achieve dramat-
ically superior health outcomes, at least
as measured by such gross indicators as
life expectancy and infant mortality.
If per capita health care spending
continues to outpace income growth by
the same margins as have prevailed for
the past forty years, current projections
indicate that total health care spending
will claim more than one-third of
national output by 2040. The increase
in health care spending would absorb
half of all economic growth by 2022 
and all of it by 2051. Medicare and
Medicaid spending as a share of GDP in
2040 would be as large as all income
and payroll taxes are today.
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Most spending will be for services well
worth what they cost. In a recent article,
Kevin Murphy and Robert Topel deter-
mined that increases in longevity
between 1970 to 2000 added to
national welfare about as much as did
all economic growth. There is every
reason to anticipate that future medical
advances will be equally beneficial. But
as total spending grows, so too will the
scope for spending on care worth less
than it costs. Even now, it would be
desirable to curtail low-benefit/high-cost
care—that is, to ration. As spending rises,
the incentive to ration will intensify. 
This brief and a companion to follow
examine some of the issues that health
care rationing raises. First, how can
rationing be done “rationally”? As British
economist Alan Williams put it: “Only
when we can be satisfied that the most
valuable thing that we are not doing is
less valuable than the least valuable
thing that we are doing, can we be sure
that we are being efficient in the pursuit
of welfare.” This brief will apply that
principle to diagnostic and interven-
tional radiology to illustrate how difficult
this standard is to meet. How can one
decide whether spending on a particular
technology is too high, too low, or about
right? The second brief draws on a
comparison of the treatment of coronary
artery disease in the United States and
Great Britain to see what happens when
rationing is excessive. It concludes by
arguing that extension of health
insurance to virtually all Americans is
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“Two decades ago
one radiologist said
that any hospital
with 200 or more
beds and a diverse
caseload could 
justify having a 
CT scanner. U.S.
hospitals reached
this standard in
1985. The United
Kingdom had not
reached this stan-
dard in 2004.”
necessary not only because it is fair and
just, as many have argued, but as a
precondition for imposing effective and
equitable cost control. Essentially,
universal coverage is necessary to
enable health care administrators to
squeeze out waste and inefficiency.
DIAGNOSTIC AND
INTERVENTIONAL RADIOLOGY:
HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH?
All competent doctors and well-
informed patients realize that physicians
are usually at least a bit unsure about
the precise cause of various signs and
symptoms, as well as about the best
method of treatment. Doctors try to
improve information in various ways,
frequently by prescribing tests. An ideal
test is cheap, produces no adverse side
effects, and is accurate in two senses: it
always identifies a pathology when it is
present and confirms its absence when
it is not present. Even accurate and safe
tests can be worthless—for instance,
when no effective treatment is available.
Resource limits are likely to raise the
standards that new diagnostic methods
must meet before adoption. Although
British scientists pioneered the devel-
opment of computed tomography (CT)
scanning, the United Kingdom was
slower to adopt this technology than
was the United States. The same has
been true of adoption of the next
imaging devices—magnetic resonance
imaging (MRI) and positron emission
tomography. The critical question is
whether the British wisely conserved
limited health care resources for more
important services or needlessly sacri-
ficed patient welfare.
The differences between use of
computed tomography and magnetic
resonance imaging in the United States
and in Great Britain illustrate the
dilemmas of health care rationing. If
resources dedicated to health care are
limited, something has to be sacrificed.
But what? And exactly how much? The
answers to these questions require large
amounts of information that is very costly
to develop and is not currently available. 
CT SCANNERS
Until the late nineteenth century, the
internal workings of the human body
could be observed only through
exploratory surgery. Then, Wilhelm
Roentgen discovered x-rays. X-ray
photographs readily distinguished bone
and fat from other tissue but can not
differentiate among types of soft tissue.
In 1972, Godfrey Hounsfield of EMI
Laboratories and Allan McLeod
Cormack of Tufts University independ-
ently invented what was initially called
computed axial tomography—now
shortened to computed tomography
(CT). A CT image, or scan, starts with
multiple x-rays generated by an x-ray
tube rotating around the patient’s body.
Computer software then integrates
these photographs into a single image or
“slice.” Sequential slices made by a CT
scanner can distinguish normal tissue
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from tumors or abscesses, thereby
identifying the size and pinpointing the
location of such abnormalities.
The speed and clarity of CT scans have
improved dramatically since early appli-
cations. Modern scanners can take up
to 192 slices a second. They can now be
used on any part of the body, such as the
lungs, during a single breath-hold of five
to ten seconds. Improved software
enables three-dimensional images of
whole organs. Radiology has split into
two distinct medical fields: diagnostic
and interventional radiology. Diagnostic
radiologists, for example, identify the
presence, size, and location of tumors.
Interventional radiologists can now
guide biopsies, place some stents, and
guide the ablation of cancerous tissue.
Experiments are under way to use CT
scanning to replace invasive colonoscopy
and angiography of coronary arteries.
CT scans have rendered obsolete several
more costly, riskier, and more uncom-
fortable procedures.
Adjusted for population, the United
States currently has about four times as
many scanners as Britain does—29.4
versus 7.1 per million in 2001—and
performs about four times as many
scans—128,000 per million versus
30,297 scans per million. Two decades
ago one radiologist said that any
hospital with 200 or more beds and a
diverse caseload could justify having a
CT scanner. U.S. hospitals reached this
standard in 1985. The United Kingdom
had not reached this standard in 2004.
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“Repeated inter-
views produce a
composite picture
in which British
radiologists believe
that they are simply
unable to provide
high quality care
for everyone.”
MAGNETIC RESONANCE
IMAGING
Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)
first entered medical practice in the
early 1980s. The procedure was first
called nuclear magnetic resonance
imaging. In fact, MRI does not use
ionizing radiation. It is actually safer
than other imaging techniques, such
as common x-ray and CT scanners.
Nevertheless, MRI practitioners jetti-
soned the “radioactive” adjective
because of concern that the word
“nuclear” would scare off patients
wary of dangerous radioactive
substances. MRI exposes the body to a
strong magnetic field that causes the
nuclei of hydrogen atoms—a major
constituent of water, the principal
constituent of human bodies—to line
up along one axis. A radio beam is then
focused in a particular direction
through a virtual “slice” of the body,
causing a tiny fraction of these nuclei
to absorb energy and change rotational
direction along two axes. When the
radio beam is turned off, the nuclei
return to their original alignment. In
the process, they emit the radio energy
they have previously absorbed.
Different tissues emit energy at various
rates, permitting sensors to form an
image of the slice. The radio beam can
be aimed at different angles through
the body, a feature that permits a
picture in any desired orientation
without requiring the patient to change
position. MRI images are sometimes
superior to those generated by other
imaging methods.
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“That the scarcity of
machines, staffing,
and money have
reduced availability,
eroded quality, and
influenced clinical
standards of therapy
seems inescapable.”
As hardware and complementary
software improved and knowledge
accumulated, more and more uses 
of magnetic resonance imaging 
have emerged. Magnetic resonance
spectroscopy can identify the chemical
composition of tissues. Magnetic
resonance angiography is used to
measure blood flow and map the
anatomy of larger arteries. Functional
magnetic resonance is used extensively
in research on neural activity inside the
brain. These technically dazzling
advances leave open the central
question—whether and in what situa-
tions MRI improves patient outcomes.
As with CT scanners, the United States
has far more MRI machines than do the
British (17.4 versus 6.74 per million
population) and performs more proce-
dures (63,200 exams per million of U.S.
population, nearly five times the rate in
England—12,874 per million). MRI
exams in the United States represented
just under one-third of the worldwide
total in 2001.
HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH?
British radiologists I consulted all
reported that machines were less of a
constraint than trained personnel and
sufficient budget to keep available
machines running. Staff shortages force
British facilities to rely on radiogra-
phers, rather than physicians, to read
films. According to British standards,
every film is supposed to be read by at
least two people, one of whom should
be a physician. Radiologists admit that
failure to meet this standard is common.
One radiologist reported that thousands
of films at the facility where he had
worked were never read at all. Because
of meager staffing, British radiologists
are unable to specialize on particular
organ systems to the degree that is
common in the United States. 
Repeated interviews produce a
composite picture in which British
radiologists believe that they are simply
unable to provide high quality care for
everyone. Waiting lists are the most
visible manifestation of shortages.
According to official guidelines, all
cancer patients requiring scans are to
receive them within two weeks. But
patients with conditions that are merely
painful often wait much longer.
So we were running big long
waiting lists. But, in practice,
there were only certain types of
diseases where you could wait ten
months or two years for your MRI
or your CT scan. Lumbar back
problems, knee problems. If it was
a case of cancer, some other
solution had to be found.
When asked what criteria are used to
screen candidates for interventional
radiology, one practitioner answered
bluntly:
Lottery. …Near St. Thomases [a
major London teaching hospital]
is a district general hospital. You’re
admitted with a complete…
inability to swallow because of a
narrowing due to cancer, then you
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won’t get an esophageal stent, a
tube that will open that narrowing,
today or tomorrow or for the next
two weeks, because there’s no
radiologist there that can do the
procedure.
Who undergoes “lottery rationing”
depends in part on where one lives, as
facilities are unevenly distributed across
the nation.
The staff didn’t put up with this
nonsense. So there was a bypass
mechanism. If you had staff who
needed a scan, they got it in a
sensible time, and the staff ’s
relatives would also bypass the
whole system and get a scan done
for them.…[S]o, if you wanted
something, had no money, it was
best to have a relative in the
hospital system who generated
some goodwill, so that, again, they
could bypass the waiting list and
so on and get done pretty quickly. 
Given the lack of radiology capacity in
the National Health Service, money
counts because it enables patients to
buy scans privately. 
Attitudes of British radiologists differ
systematically from those of U.S. physi-
cians regarding the need for and desir-
ability of CT and MRI scans. In U.S.
emergency rooms CT scans have
become routine. In the largest hospital
in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan
area, for example, triage nurses
routinely prescribe CT scans before
6
physicians have seen patients. In all,
about one-third of all ER patients are
scanned. The reactions of British radiol-
ogists to such free use of CT scanning
vary. One who acknowledged that the
United States was way ahead of Britain
in emergency room radiology admitted
chagrin that only in leading British
trauma centers was scanning capacity
routinely available at all times. Others
expressed the view that U.S. physicians
scanned more people than is medically
or economically warranted.
RATIONAL OR IRRATIONAL
RATIONING?
That the scarcity of machines, staffing,
and money have reduced availability,
eroded quality, and influenced clinical
standards of therapy seems inescapable.
What is unclear is whether the large
difference between British and U.S.
spending on radiology reflects a sensible
decision on how to allocate scarce
medical resources. Although the
anecdotal testimony of most British physi-
cians I interviewed suggests significant
loss of potential benefits, not all agree,
and quantitative measures of impact on
patient outcomes are nonexistent.
A formal framework for evaluating the
worth of improvements in diagnosis
illuminates the problem. U.S. analysts
have suggested that a complete evalu-
ation of improved technology, such 
as diagnostic imaging, requires six 
kinds of studies: 
1. Does the test perform as intended in
POLICY BRIEF
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a physical sense? For example, can a
newer CT scanner distinguish tumor
from normal tissue more effectively
than an older model? 
2. Is the test sensitive and specific? For
example, does a stress test accurately
show heart disease when it is present
and clearly indicate its absence when
it is not? 
3. Does the test alter the clinician’s
diagnosis? When simple methods
work, sophisticated techniques may
add nothing but cost. 
4. Does the test affect the patient’s
treatment? Accurately diagnosing a
condition for which no effective
treatment is available has little value. 
5. Do the test and associated changes in
treatment improve patient health? 
6. What are the social consequences of
the test as measured, for example, by
cost effectiveness when compared to
another procedure?
Evaluations of the first and second types
are most common. A count of studies of
magnetic resonance spectroscopy for
brain tumors through 2004 revealed
eighty-five level-one studies and eight
level-two studies had been performed,
but only two level-three studies, two
level-four studies, and no level-five or
level-six studies. Yet it is level-five and
level-six studies that are most relevant
for administering limited health budgets.
To further complicate matters, the
findings of each of the six types of
studies of efficacy are highly specific to
particular illnesses. CT or MRI may
significantly improve diagnosis or
treatment of one type of cancer, but not
another. Simply showing that a new
machine produces sharper images in
less time than an older machine means
little. For example, imaging can distin-
guish whether a patient is suffering
from the early stages of Alzheimer’s
disease or some other form of dementia.
But the treatment, which is the same in
either case, has only small benefits and
negligible negative side effects. Therapy
to slow the advance of Alzheimer’s is
therefore nearly always indicated
whatever the outcome of screening. For
that reason, the test is not worth the
cost, even though it is diagnostically
accurate. In still other cases, imaging is
acknowledged to produce benefits, but
the benefits are small relative to cost.
Audiologists frequently prescribe an
MRI for patients with hearing loss
because there is a small chance—about
1 in 100,000—that the problem stems
from an acoustic neuroma, a tumor that
is ordinarily treatable and that the test
will reveal. U.S. physicians will often
prescribe the test. British physicians
said they seldom would.
These two examples suggest the diffi-
culty that planners face within a budget-
constrained system. Judgments about
the value of imaging vary widely and are
highly specific to particular conditions.
Furthermore, many costly studies, each
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of a particular condition, are needed 
to show whether the test improves
patient outcomes at reasonable cost.
Few such studies have been carried out
relative to the huge number of discrete
medical conditions.
The lack of such studies means that
everyone is flying blind—or, at least,
with obscured vision. Planners adminis-
tering a limited budget do not know how
many or what kinds of machines to buy
or how extensively to staff them. And
physicians do not know on which condi-
tions the new equipment will produce
demonstrable improvements in patient
outcomes. Every British radiologist I
interviewed expressed the view, usually
with caution and invariably with
courtesy, that the United States wastes a
lot of money on diagnostic equipment
and tests that produce little or no benefit
to patients. They also indicated that the
British spend too little on imaging, with
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the result that physicians often lack the
information to provide patients life-
saving or pain-relieving care.
The British have faced the same
problem in deciding how much to spend
on diagnostic and interventional
radiology that any budget-constrained
system would face with respect to all
discrete investments. How much should
be spent on the investment? How much
should be spent on very costly research
to evaluate that investment? The United
States has not had to confront such
questions. But as outlays rise, the need
to set health care spending priorities will
intensify. It is time for the United States
to begin investing in the knowledge it
will need to control growth of health
care spending. The information will be
needed whether the controls come from
the government, private payers, or new
entities yet to be formed.
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